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The Salmon Recovery Industrial Complex: Ten Basic Policy Realities

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Robert T. Lackey
Department of Fisheries, Wildlife, and Conservation Sciences
Oregon State University

robert.lackey@oregonstate.edu

Introduction

The United States has spent, and continues to commit, billions of dollars to reverse the decline in the abundance of wild (in contrast to hatchery-origin) salmon and steelhead along the West Coast of North America (California, Oregon, Washington, and Idaho).  After spending billions, success, if any, has been limited and rare (Gustafson et al. 2007, Jaeger and Scheuerell, 2023, Bilby et al. 2024, Ford et al. 2025).  How can so much money be spent for so long with such disappointing results?  Perhaps an even more interesting question is why the situation is likely to continue.

The focus here is on 6 anadromous West Coast salmonid species:

  • Chinook salmon (also called king salmon), Oncorhynchus tshawytscha
  • Coho salmon (also called silver salmon) O. kisutch
  • Sockeye salmon (also called red salmon) O. nerka
  • Chum salmon (also called dog salmon) O. keta
  • Pink salmon (also called humpback salmon) O. gorbuscha
  • Steelhead (the anadromous form of rainbow trout) O. mykiss

Although steelhead are classified as trout, I include them when I refer to West Coast “salmon.”

I assert that the lack of West Coast salmon recovery is disappointing, but it is rarely because of a lack of scientific information or understanding.  Rather, it is because the policy problem has been treated simplistically, and with a bureaucratic and legal approach is doomed to fail.  My perspective on the full complement of politicians, bureaucrats, scientists, technicians, and policy advocates engaged (and usually funded) in some aspect of salmon recovery is partly inspired by President Eisenhower’s famous 1961 speech about the risks of creating a Military Industrial Complex (MIC).  For salmon recovery, I will label the analogous assemblage of individuals and organizations, funded by the multibillion-dollar expenditures from many sources, as the Salmon Recovery Industrial Complex (SRIC).

Currently, SRIC is well funded by a mix of government and private support.  Individuals employed in the SRIC are paid directly, often through contracts or grants, by governments (Federal, State, local, and tribal administrative units and State and private universities), or private parties (advocacy or interest organizations, foundations, professional groups, companies and corporations, and consultancies).  Nominally private funding organizations are often supported by tax-advantaged (i.e., tax-deductible) donations from individuals and organizations.  Such private funding is, therefore, subsidized by taxpayers.  Policy advocacy groups representing many different political perspectives abound, and many have extensive paid scientific, legal, and lobbying staff to advance their goals.  Such advocacy organizations (either by their paid staff or under contract to outside experts) often produce peer-reviewed scientific products that align with their organizations’ policy preferences.

Delusional policy realities and pervasive optimism abound despite sustained multibillion-dollar expenditures and little recovery success.  All this exists, despite a massive, ever-expanding peer-reviewed scientific literature, and, perhaps, partially driven by a pervasive, but unfounded optimism (Figure 1).  For example, based on my personal interactions, it is frequent within the SRIC for individuals to assume some variation of the notion that “if the public and policy makers just understood the science relative to the 200-year decline of West Coast salmon, then the path to restoration would be obvious, and the difficult, but necessary political decisions would be broadly supported.”  To some scientists in the SRIC, this belief leads to the maxim:  “Everyone knows what the salmon recovery goal should be.  We understand the science, now listen to us about what should be done.”  But what is the recovery goal?  Is it to avoid an Endangered Species Act listing, levels which could be a few percent of historic numbers?  Is the goal to sustain runs to support a limited fishery, perhaps a third of the historical (1850s) run size?  Is it to return salmon runs to 100% of historic (1850s) levels?  What role, if any, should hatchery fish play in sustaining or increasing run size?  If the overarching goal is to return wild runs to some historical level, why should any harvest of hatchery-origin salmon be permitted because some wild fish are killed in the process?  Although these questions are central to any recovery program, they are rarely explicitly agreed to by all participants.

Why does the SRIC continue unabated when there is essentially no significant indication of success (i.e., there is little evidence that wild runs are increasing as a result of the SRIC’s actions)?  If the path to salmon recovery is clear, why is it not supported more generally across the political spectrum?  Or, perhaps SRIC is an example of symbolic politics (i.e., the implementation of an aggressive effort to meet a publicly stated policy goal that is unlikely to be successful, but will demonstrate to concerned citizens and, more broadly, the electorate that the problem is being addressed)?  Or, perhaps, it is an example of virtue signaling (i.e., expressing sympathy for a popular policy goal without the expectation of the action making much difference)?

My goals here are to propose answers to two questions:  (1) why did the billions spent by the SRIC not successfully recover salmon runs, and (2) why is it likely that this expenditure will continue, with the same outcome?

This policy case study is not new, and the basic facts about the overall salmon recovery failures are well documented (Nehlsen et al  1991;  Gustafson et al 2007; Waldman and Quinn  2022;   Quinn 2018, 2025).  Further, the choices that have been made about West Coast salmon since the mid-1800s are fundamentally similar to those in other 3 places where salmon originally occurred (i.e., the Asian Far East, Western and Northern Europe, and Eastern North America).  Lack of scientific understanding was rarely the primary cause.  The general pattern of decline nearly always followed a well-established inverse correlation:  as the number of people and their associated activities increased, the size of salmon runs decreased.

Although not well documented, the current West Coast salmon decline arguably began in the early 1800s in what is now Idaho, Oregon, Washington, and British Columbia (at the time, called the Oregon Territory) with conflicts between Great Britain and the United States over the lucrative beaver fur market.  The British Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) tried to keep American beaver trappers from moving northward into what is now British Columbia by implementing a policy of aggressively trapping all beaver inhabiting the Columbia River Basin and the surrounding area.  This created a large “fur desert,” an area largely devoid of beaver.  The hope was that American beaver trappers would shun these areas of disputed sovereignty.  With the demise of the beaver population, the ubiquitous beaver dams soon disappeared.  At the time, the effect on salmon runs was unknown and not a concern to the HBC, but it was likely ecologically significant because beaver dams generally benefit some salmon species.  Politically, the beaver eradication plan worked as intended.  The American fur trappers avoided areas where beaver populations had been eliminated or much reduced.

The subsequent (1848) discovery of gold at Sutter’s Mill, Coloma, California with the ensuing influx of gold miners, soon followed by widespread West Coast mining activities, accelerated the decline of salmon.  This decline is generally well known and documented (Lackey et al 2006).  Beyond California, in Oregon, Washington, and Idaho, the salmon decline began in the 1860s with extensive mining, logging, agriculture, and dam construction.  By the late 1800s, even the Columbia River Basin — once home to legendary runs — had lost most of its salmon.  The decline in salmon runs was obvious, and hatchery programs, initiated in the 1870s, became the primary approach to sustain the West Coast salmon runs.  Supplemental stocking from hatcheries has long been employed to sustain or increase declining runs (and harvests) (Courter et al. 2023; Harrison et al. 2026). Even with hatchery supplementation, over decades and centuries, wild salmon runs dwindled to very low numbers, as they are now.  Today, most salmon in West Coast streams and rivers are the progeny of parents who spawned in hatcheries, and the existing recreational, commercial, and tribal harvest is principally supported by hatcheries.

The West Coast salmon decline followed the pattern that previously played out in (1) the Asian Far East at least a thousand years ago, (2) Europe starting 500 years ago, and (3) eastern North America starting in the 1600s.  At its core, the pattern is that when human populations (and the associated economic activities) expanded and landscapes transformed, salmon runs diminished.

Salmon consumers, unfamiliar with the West Coast’s current salmon status (i.e., many current runs have been extirpated while the remaining runs are at single-digit levels of the 1850s run sizes), may wonder how salmon can be available year-round in their local retail market, yet are now a remnant of their former abundance in West Coast streams and rivers.  The much-reduced size of the runs is obscured for them because (1) pen-raised salmon, usually grown in marine environments (British Columbia, Chile, Norway), are readily available year-round in the retail market, and (2) wild Pacific salmon are abundant elsewhere, especially in Alaska and the Russian Far East, and these harvests also support the West Coast retail market.

It is indeed ironic that retail salmon are available year-round on the West Coast, yet the local current runs are shadows of their former levels, and many are listed as either threatened or endangered under the U.S. Endangered Species Act.  Today, roughly 80% of salmon in the region are hatchery-origin.  While hatchery salmon releases support most fishing, they complicate recovery by masking declines and potentially introducing genetic and ecological risks to wild stocks (Lackey et al. 2006;  Harrison et al.  2026).

The Scientific and Policy Context

Salmon are resilient animals.  In fact, no species of Pacific salmon faces extinction, but many local populations (i.e., stocks, runs, distinct population segments, or evolutionarily significant segments) are gone, and hundreds more are at risk (Gustafson et al. 2007, Ford et al. 2025).  Of the over a thousand geographically distinct populations in California, Oregon, Washington, and Idaho that existed before the early 1800s, nearly 30% are extinct, and most surviving runs are less than 5% of historical numbers.  The causes — habitat alteration, dams, irrigation, harvest, climatic changes, competition with non-native fish species, interactions with hatchery-origin salmon, and many others — are well-documented in a massive peer-reviewed scientific literature (Quinn 2018, 2025).  What remains contested is the relative importance of these factors and, more fundamentally, the willingness of society to make the trade-offs necessary for recovery.  The stark reality is that, despite billions of dollars invested and decades of scientific effort, the recovery of wild salmon remains elusive.

It is important to reiterate that the geographic scope of this article is limited to the West Coast (California, Oregon, Washington, and Idaho), and, indirectly, the North Pacific Ocean to the extent that salmon originating from those four States use the marine environment during their life cycles.  Especially in the far north (adjacent to Alaska and the Russian Far East), the North Pacific Ocean is warming, and this correlates with important ecological changes.  For historical context, the overall salmon abundance in the North Pacific is higher now than at least since the 1970s.  Whatever ecological conditions or human interventions are driving the change (e.g., warmer temperatures, industrial-scale major increases in stocking from Alaska, Japanese, and Russian hatcheries, or others) have primarily benefited pink and chum salmon (Connors et al. 2025).

This two-century, persistent, and predictable West Coast salmon decline raises two fundamental policy questions:  (1) What precisely does society wish to recover? and (2) Why have recovery efforts nearly always failed their publicly stated goals?  I will argue here that the answer lies not in inadequate science or bad actors,  but a suite of policy realities that capture the interplay of ecological constraints, societal priorities, individual (personal) preferences, and a failure to incorporate overall policy realities into recovery goal setting.  Even in those few cases where runs have greatly increased (at least temporarily), it is rarely linked clearly to specific SRIC recovery efforts.

Scientific information is useful, even necessary, to unraveling the causes of the long-term decline of West Coast salmon, but unraveling the policy context is essential to selecting a salmon recovery program that would actually work.  Here are the core policy realities that have, and will, drive (and constrain) any West Coast salmon recovery program.  It is within these policy realities that provide the explanations of (1) why past SRIC recovery efforts have predominantly not succeeded, and (2) which policy changes must happen if wild salmon recovery is to be achieved.

Reality 1:  Salmon Recovery Is a Wicked Policy Problem with Zero-sum Tendencies

From the political science perspective, sustaining (or increasing) the size of salmon runs is a classic “wicked” policy challenge.  A wicked policy problem is intractable, has no definitive solution, involves multiple stakeholders, and is characterized by uncertainty, conflicting values, and interdependent causes (Termeer et al. 2019).  The salmon recovery case study meets all these criteria.  Additionally, the SRIC operates in a political environment where any proposed efficacious (for salmon recovery) policy choice results in unmistakable (and vocal) policy losers (a zero-sum feature).  Predicting with high confidence the economic and political consequences of many recovery policy choices is problematic, and this uncertainty skews policy-makers away from bold changes that have uncertain outcomes.  For those employed in the SRIC, but without a sense of the overall policy context, the sense of a possible “win-win” policy choice sounds tantalizing.  However, it is an unachievable target that becomes apparent after routine policy analysis.  In short, there are always policy winners and losers in salmon recovery policy, but pitching the win-win is certainly tempting.  An old policy cliché is especially apropos for the SRIC:  “Policy making is all about picking winners and losers.”

Reality 2:  The SRIC Funding Model Encourages a Public Optimism Bias

A near-universal “optimism bias” emanating from the SRIC creates unrealistic public expectations about what level of salmon recovery likely will be achieved by the billions being spent.  In part, optimism is prevalent because most SRIC funding is “soft money,” and it must be regularly “sold” for it to continue, and funders are more likely to financially support programs that imply success.  Also, because SRIC funding is a mix of taxpayer and nominally private sources (i.e., many private funders provide money that is subsidized by being classified as a tax-advantaged, tax-deductible, or tax-favored donation), it is important to wrap funding pitches in optimism because even private funding is partially subsidized by taxpayers.  Unsurprisingly and for different reasons, this competition for funding creates an understandable incentive for scientists, managers, administrators, and policy makers to convey policy optimism, even when evidence and experience suggest otherwise.  Such bureaucratic optimism is characteristic of many programs that rely on competitive funding.  For the SRIC, the result is a proliferation of narrowly focused studies and sophisticated technical debates (i.e., about hatchery and wild fish genetics, dam passage efficiency, likely climate change impacts, pesticide effects, competition and predation impacts, and many others) that, while generally well-intentioned and often scientifically rigorous, rarely address the overarching question:  what level of wild salmon recovery is ecologically, politically, and economically feasible?

Reality 3:  The U.S. Endangered Species Act (ESA) Encourages Lawfare

ESA has been the dominant policy driver of West Coast salmon policy and management for four decades. For salmon recovery, some critics of the status quo assert that ESA has fostered “lawfare” (i.e., suing, or the threat of suing, to achieve desired salmon policy objectives) rather than supporting recovery programs that might actually work (Figure 2).  They may point to the fact that the cost of some construction and development is inflated for no demonstrable improvement in salmon runs.  Conversely, ESA supporters typically argue that the law is the only tool available that has any chance of being effective.  Also, for some advocacy organizations, it has proved to be a powerful weapon in their arsenal.  In direct response to such lawsuits (or the threat of lawsuits), the SRIC’s overall budget has increased significantly.  Return on Investment (ROI) analysis of Columbia River Basin expenditures, for example, has indicated that billions of dollars are now spent annually by the SRIC to comply with salmon ESA-compliance issues, but salmon runs have rarely improved  (Franks and Lackey,  2015;  Jaeger and Scheuerell  2023;  Ford et al. 2025).  Beyond the substantial economic cost, ESA enforcement continues to create seeming policy paradoxes:  (1) ESA-listed salmon are still routinely harvested under government approval;  (2) hatchery supplementation, mandated by other legislation to sustain fishing, is often challenged by ESA lawsuits as putting wild salmon at genetic risk;  (3) unlike most other ESA-listed “species,” no biological salmon species is at risk of extinction because ESA enforcement treats “populations” as “species”;   (4) it is now typical along the West Coast for most salmon in a particular run (of one species) to be of hatchery origin rather than the offspring of salmon that spawned naturally in a stream;  and (5) most salmon in the retail market are raised in net pens and are not derived from natural spawning or the product of hatcheries, thus there are abundant salmon available in grocery stores and restaurants.

Reality 4:  Competing Policy Priorities Circumscribe the Realistic Salmon Recovery Choices

Unlike a few other ESA-listed species (e.g., wolves and grizzlies), no one has ever sought to eradicate salmon, but sustaining or increasing salmon runs competes with a diverse and sizable set of individual and collective personal priorities.  For example, people also want (1) low-cost and desirable food, (2) abundant, reliable, and cheap energy, and (3) an economy that creates and sustains high-paying jobs.  For salmon, adequate water of sufficient quality is an ecological necessity.  For food production, farmers need water, and often in large amounts, which reduces the amount or quality of water available for salmon.  For energy needs, baseload production in many high- and medium-income countries is generated by hydro power (which is detrimental for salmon).  As for high-paying jobs, energy production and national wealth are highly correlated:  the more energy produced, the higher a country’s GDP (not an advantageous political landscape for salmon recovery advocates).   As for providing salmon for the retail market, there is high demand.  The market, however, is not supplied by free-living salmon, but by aquaculture (mainly net-pens in marine, near-shore environments).  In California, Oregon, Washington, and Idaho, in spite of the poor state of West Coast runs, salmon in the retail market are available year-round.

Reality 5:  Competition for Water and Watersheds Is Fierce and Highly Litigious

As it is for many ecological policy challenges, competition for water (as well as watersheds) is often a defining flashpoint in salmon policy.  In the western United States, competing demands — for agriculture, municipal use, forest products, industry, artificial intelligence data centers, and energy — usually mean wild salmon advocates are competing for an essential commodity (of which the water itself is only part) that many other policy advocates also value highly.  For example, the recent removal of several relatively large West Coast dams, such as the two on the Elwha River (Washington) and four on the Klamath River (California/Oregon border, involved structures that were no longer economically viable as electricity producers, afforded minimal flood protection, and supplied a relatively small number of farmers with irrigation water (Figure 3).  Had these six dams generated substantially more electricity at lower cost, provided greater flood protection, or supplied irrigation water to politically powerful farmers, then it is likely that there would have been insufficient political support for their removal.

Reality 6:  The Regional Human Population Trajectory Is a Major Policy Constraint

Because the West Coast is a “fill-in” region in demographic terminology, the size of the future human population is particularly difficult to predict.  Regardless, the demands of the human population are a major factor limiting recovery options.  For example, the current population of California, Oregon, Washington, and Idaho is approximately 54 million.  Although birthrates have declined markedly in many countries to much less than the   ̴2.1 per female needed for population stability, the West Coast population is growing relatively rapidly, mostly from new residents from within the U.S., as well as immigration.  Without the typical age profile (i.e., “skewed old”) of most regions of the world, the West Coast will assuredly grow at least by half, from the current 53 million to 80 million by 2100, possibly many more.  Regardless of the actual West Coast population at the end of this century, the residents will collectively require housing, schools, roads, airports, mass transit, energy production, reliable electrical grids, food, and recreational opportunities — demands that translate (for salmon) into less or suboptimal habitat, poorer quality water, competition for water with energy intensive computer farms to support artificial intelligence computer programs, agriculture growing and processing operations, and others.  Yet, in most salmon policy analyses and discussions, the additional human population effect on salmon runs is rarely explicitly considered in recovery strategies.  Rather, it is often treated as an unstated policy constraint, and, if considered, is buried in ambiguous wording and rarely noticed, much less discussed.

Reality 7: Cheap, Abundant, and Reliable Energy is a Competing Salmon Recovery Priority

Worldwide, energy use (especially electricity) is positively correlated with the standard of living.  There are no high-income, low-energy-use countries.  For energy production, the West Coast has many large, high-gradient rivers, the requisite for a large hydroelectric facility.  Hydro generation is reliable, relatively cheap, and overall, an ideal source of baseload power.  Irregular or intermittent energy sources (primarily solar and wind) must have sufficient baseload power generation (or battery storage) to offset their intermittent nature.  In regions where it is viable, hydropower has proven to be a reliable (and relatively cheap) source of baseload electricity.  Conversely, there is a well-known downside:  those people prioritizing anadromous fish runs are policy losers when rivers were dammed.  From a scientific perspective, there is no “right” balance between baseload power production, irrigation water, flood control, data center operations, or recovering salmon runs.  Rather, it is an excellent example of the previously stated assertion that “Policy making is all about picking winners and losers.”

Reality 8: Floods Produce Anxiety and a Demand for Flood Protection

Floods have been feared by people for millennia, and much of the West Coast is exceedingly flood-prone.  For example, in the winter of 1861-62, the entire California Central Valley, the Klamath River and its tributaries, the lower Columbia River and its tributaries, and many others experienced catastrophic floods.  Not surprisingly, flood control has long been a political priority on the West Coast.  The ability to decrease flood risk has increased markedly since 1861 with the increasing capability to build large, reliable dams that partially regulate flows.  However, dams block or at least hinder migrating salmon (both those returning to freshwater to spawn and those leaving freshwater nursery areas for the sea).  Nor are the lakes created behind the dams helpful to sustaining salmon abundance.  Fishways of many designs are successful to varying degrees, but a free-flowing river is nearly always superior for salmon returning to freshwater or leaving freshwater for the ocean.  Other flood control activities (i.e., channelization, filling flood-prone areas, bank armoring, levee construction, etc.) further alter the landscape upon which salmon are dependent.  Despite most people’s inherent political support for sustaining salmon runs, this support does not often override the desire to avoid future floods. 

Reality 9:  Many People Place a High Value on Harvesting Salmon Beyond Their Food Value

For the foreseeable future, net pen production in Europe, North America, and South America will provide sufficient salmon for the retail market.  However, for the West Coast, sustaining a substantial salmon harvest (recreational, commercial, and tribal fishing) without hatcheries is unrealistic.  Most remaining runs of wild salmon in California, Oregon, Washington, and Idaho are at a fraction of their 1850s run levels and will not sustainably support substantial fishing pressure.  Juvenile salmon releases from hatcheries currently number in the many billions, and these fish (as returning adults) provide most of the West Coast salmon fishing opportunities.  Perhaps, as some argue, continuing to rely on hatcheries dooms any future recovery of wild salmon runs, but others observe that wild salmon are currently such a small percentage of most West Coast runs that they could not support sustained harvests.  For those who value harvest (recreational, commercial, and tribal) on the West Coast, there is no other realistic near-term option to sustaining fishable run sizes except hatcheries.

Reality 10:  Lack of Trust in the Impartiality of SRIC Scientists Constrains Their Policy Impact

Scientific information should be an important component of salmon debates, but “facts” are only a part of policy disagreements because most such conflict is over competing values.  The scientific enterprise comprises individuals who nowadays are highly partisan in their political leanings (Motta 2018,  Ross et al. 2018).  In some cases, scientific information used in policy debates is little more than policy advocacy masquerading as relevant science.  Such normative science is used to covertly advocate for a particular and predetermined policy preference.  Perhaps not surprisingly, it is typical for every policy advocate or advocacy organization in salmon policy deliberations to offer science that implicitly supports their particular policy inclination.  Conversely, rather than demand policy neutrality, some policy makers appear to encourage scientists to “tell us what we should do,” even though the core of most salmon policy debate hinges not on scientifically-driven, but on value-driven policy preferences.  If scientists are to play a helpful role in such policy debates (and they should), policy makers must trust in their impartiality.  Ultimately, scientists must be trusted, or their input will be categorized as simply another advocacy pitch and categorized accordingly.

Implications and Conclusion

The lack of West Coast salmon recovery was not caused primarily by ignorance, much less can it be ascribed to a lack of sound scientific understanding.  Rather, it is a reflection of the failure to describe openly the mix of evolving, uncertain, competing, politically divisive, and often mutually exclusive policy choices.  Every potential policy choice has its own set of policy winners and losers, and in most cases, “paying off” the losers has not led to a stable political compromise.  Future salmon recovery strategies that ignore this policy reality are destined to fail, as they have for at least the past two centuries.  Technical fixes (fish ladders, hatcheries, habitat restoration) cannot overcome core policy drivers such as the ecological effects of human population growth, market and personal economic choices, lifestyle preferences, and individual choices about a host of decisions.  Such realities should be clearly explained to policy makers, the public, and other interested parties, even if it is reasonably certain that the political dynamic will only support the current, failed recovery strategy.

Meaningful salmon recovery requires transformative changes that are politically unsettling to many:  (1) revising ESA to enable strategic prioritization as is typically allowed for policy tradeoffs as occurs for most public issues, (2) confronting unpleasant ecological realities such as the fact that many aquatic environments are now better suited for the now thriving nonnative fish species, as West Coast salmon slowly decline to remnant runs), (3) finding a better way for the public to weigh in on balancing the various water demands such as weighing the importance of sustaining baseload power generation vs. restoring wild salmon runs, and (4) accepting that nearly everything that humans value directly competes with restoring salmon runs (e.g., reducing the risk of floods almost always adversely affects salmon runs).  Such policy changes entail major costs — economic, political, and cultural — that society has historically been unwilling to bear.  In other words, along with the political winners, there will be political losers:  for the losers, they know they will be losers, and they most likely must be accommodated to create a viable, stable political compromise.

Considering the remainder of this century and absent transformative change in society’s priorities, salmon recovery efforts will continue as largely symbolic gestures:  expensive but politically useful, tangible but largely ineffective.  Perhaps these expenditures will continue to successfully serve as “guilt money,” a collective salve (and political cover) for the discomfort of ecological loss.  If the policy goal is genuine recovery to anything approaching fishable runs, candor about trade-offs is imperative, and the legal constraints caused by ESA need to be explicitly addressed.  Otherwise, scientists, policy makers, and the public must confront the uncomfortable and ongoing truth:  returning wild salmon to “fishable” abundance is ecologically and theoretically possible, but only if society is willing to make currently unpopular choices that fundamentally alter how people live.  To imply that wild salmon recovery can be done otherwise is to perpetuate a delusional reality.

References:

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Waldman, J.R., Quinn, T.P.  2022.  North American diadromous fishes:  drivers of decline and potential for recovery in the Anthropocene.  Sci. Adv. 8, eabl5486   https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.abl5486

PACIFIC SALMON COMMISSION SEMINAR — Columbia River Basin: How Would Ending Fishing and Closing Hatcheries Change Wild Salmon and Steelhead Abundance?*

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Robert T. Lackey

Department of Fisheries, Wildlife, and Conservation Sciences

Oregon State University

Corvallis, Oregon  97331

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https://media.oregonstate.edu/media/t/1_xoz803bc

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Seminar Summary: The overall public policy goal of restoring Pacific salmon wild runs in the Columbia River Basin appears to enjoy widespread public support.  Billions of dollars have failed to reverse the long-term, overall decline.  To answer the question of whether the effort to rebuild wild runs through the release of hatchery-produced salmon, I asked 58 well-known salmon scientists to predict (anonymously) how the overall abundance of Columbia River Basin salmon (including steelhead) would change after 20 years if fishing was stopped and hatcheries were closed.  About 83% predicted that current (wild plus hatchery) salmon abundance (overall Columbia Basin run) would decline without hatchery stocking and fishing.  Most surveyed experts predicted that stopping fishing and closing hatcheries would not greatly change the current overall wild-only abundance in the Basin.  Based on these results, salmon fishing and hatchery additions are not currently believed to be among the major drivers of the low abundance of wild salmon in the Columbia River Basin.  The current overall abundance of wild salmon in the Columbia River Basin (roughly 3-5% of pre-1850s levels) is within the expected range, given the amount and availability of high-quality salmon habitat, past and current ecological changes, and overarching trends in oceanic and climate conditions.  Thus, stopping fishing and closing hatcheries likely will not drastically change the current wild salmon abundance in the Basin — and it may well drive wild runs even lower, according to many experts.

*Presented at a Pacific Salmon Commission (Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada) seminar on November 29, 2023.

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Click Here for the Seminar Link

Darwin was Right: A Scientist Needs a Heart of Stone

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Robert T. Lackey

A few months ago I was asked to present my thoughts about what scientists can do to reverse the decline of public trust in the policy impartiality of scientists.  The importance of good science is broadly accepted across all political ideologies, but the level of trust in scientists (as separate from science) has probably never been lower. Here is the transcript of that talk presented at the 56th Annual Meeting of the Oregon Chapter of the American Fisheries Society, March 6, 2020, Bend, Oregon:

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I appreciate the opportunity to wrap up this session:  “Communicating Science Across Different Domains.”   Yes, it is certainly a fitting topic for all of us — and based on the range of perspectives we’ve heard this morning — it reinforces its timeliness.  Further — these days — given the privileged standing afforded science in the legal and policy world — and the potential for its misuse — both intentional and unintentional — it is absolutely critical for all of us all “to get the  science question right.”

OK — my specific assignment today is to answer this question:   How should scientists assure that they are sticking to science — and not drifting into policy advocacy?

I am very sure that each of you frequently see examples of “advocacy masquerading as science.”  I know I do — every day!   And — for those of us who are scientists — and those of us who work at the interface of science – policy – and management — how do we avoid this?

Let me start with a simple “role playing” exercise.

First ― imagine that you are now in the spotlight — having been summoned to the state capitol to provide information to the Natural Resources Committee of the Oregon State Senate.   Great career opportunity!

Second ― imagine that the Committee is faced with a contentious question:   whether they should officially support — or oppose — the construction of a dam designed to store water to help alleviate August droughts.   And — be assured — dams are always politically controversial!

Third ― you are a scientist who has studied in great detail this particular proposed dam.  In short — you are indisputably a scientific expert on the topic.

What is the proper role for you – a scientist?  This is not a trick question — but it is also not a simple one.

My blunt answer:  follow Charles Darwin’s recommendation for scientists who find themselves in such circumstances — develop a heart of stone!

Why exactly did Darwin call for scientists to develop a Heart of Stone?  For sure — today his advice might seem a bit passe in this era of trigger warnings — safe spaces — and postmodernism!   But — what exactly are the alternatives to a heart of stone idea? — and why did Darwin not support these?

At a basic level — legislators — policy makers — and the public — expect scientists to even-handedly present scientific information relevant to the question under consideration.  Seems simple enough!   And — it is hard to argue against this expectation — this idealized view that you heard way back in Political Science 101 — right?

But — more fundamentally — what exactly — is scientific information?  And — equally important — what information is not science?  In short — what is this thing everyone casually labels as “science?”  After all — relatively speaking — the notion of science is only a few hundred years old — at least it has only been broadly popular for a few hundred years.  And — for sure — there are many other ways to acquire information — and indeed science is only one.

Francis Bacon popularized the basic principles of the “scientific method” several hundred years ago.  This is the reason why modern science is sometimes referred to as “Baconian Science.”

To be considered scientific information — it must have 4 characteristics.  In philosophy — as described in their often opaque — even cerebral — philosophical jargon — they are called the “big 4.”

First, the information must be rational — that is — it relies on the senses.  Second, it must be acquired systematically —  a path that is clearly explained.  Third, it must be testable — others can evaluate the results — it is not based on faith.  Fourth, the results must be reproducible — others following the same procedures and methodologies will come up with the same answer.  If the results cannot be reproduced — it is back to the drawing board!

But — there are other kinds of knowledge — and these are not better — or worse — but they are not science.  For example — knowledge gained through experience is ubiquitous — but it is not science.  A common example is fishermen’s knowledge accumulated after years on the water — or perhaps passed down over generations based on a sort of collective experience.

Most definitely — experiential knowledge may be a terrific source of information — but it does not possess the 4 essential characteristics of science.

Think back to Darwin’s time — the dominant faith affecting science was what might be called the classical Christian view of creation.  These days — in my experience — the dominant faith in the areas of science that I work — is what is often called “Green Religion.”  In its simplest formulation — this faith assumes that natural ecosystems — those undisturbed by humans — are inherently superior to human-altered ones.  And — applying a similar theological litmus test — native species are a priori superior to non-native ones.

Don’t get me wrong — there is absolutely nothing inappropriate — or appropriate — with religious or faith-based postulates — but they are outside the purview of science.

But in Darwin’s time — it was not Green Religion — but rather Christian theology that conflicted with the scientific method.  In Darwin’s time — scientists were expected to accept upfront the creationist view of the origin of species — and most did so voluntarily.  But — Darwin argued — do your research — test your hypotheses against the observable facts — draw your conclusions.  Stop there!   Do not presuppose anything!  In short — as uncomfortable as it might be — Darwin encouraged scientists to develop a heart of stone.

But even if a scientist follows Darwin’s advice to the letter — that scientist must be trusted.  Thus — managers — policy makers — and especially the public — would like to assume that a scientist is presenting straight — unbiased facts and interpretations.  But in reality — the question is always there — is that scientist sticking to the science — or is he slanting the science to cleverly push a particular policy preference?  As a practical matter — if a reader or listener trusts a scientist — that reader or listener will almost certainly accept the veracity of what is being presented by that scientist.

OK — the central question still remains — are scientists trusted by the public these days?  In essence, given that trust is essential for scientists to play a useful role in policy making and management — what do the national polls show?

First — the good news — there have been a lot of polling done on the trust question.  Now the bad news — no poll that I could find addressed fisheries — or any other aspect of natural resource management.  The closest discipline I could find was “environmental science” — for sure not a perfect fit — but it will have to do.

OK — to what extent does the public trust scientists on the topic of environmental issues?  The results?  In a Washington Post/ABC national poll — 40% — 4 in 10 — said they place little or no trust in the impartiality of scientists.  But — even more disturbing to me — the other 60% were not all that supportive — they were lukewarm in their level of trust of scientists.

In another more recent national poll — this one by the PEW Research Center — barely a third of the respondents said environmental scientists provided fair and accurate information all — or most of the time.

Why such a low level of trust?   We can speculate about what has caused this loss of trust — and many people have.  Regardless — there are some things that scientists themselves can do to help rebuild trust.

The first thing that we need to do is to eliminate “stealth policy advocacy.”

The second is to stamp out normative science from all aspects of the scientific enterprise.

Now — the stealthy part — normative science is very similar in appearance to regular or traditional science — but it has an embedded or hidden policy preference.  And the challenging part — it is often very difficult to pick up on this embedded policy preference!

Don’t be so sure that you are not at risk for normative science.  Why?   Detecting normative science is not as easy as it might appear.  After all — what is being presented:

  •  Looks like regular science
  •  Sounds like regular science
  •  Is offered by people who appear to be “scientists”

Even experienced policy makers and managers can be deceived!  What chance does the general public have?

Let me circle back to the example I started with — the proposal to build a water supply dam — and the proper role of scientists in the decision-making process.  Let’s have a little more role-playing — imagine that you are a world expert in some ecological discipline.  You have been assigned to a blue ribbon team of similarly elite scientists.  Your job is to determine the likely ecological consequences of building a dam on this river.

OK — exactly how would you describe the scientific results to that Senate Committee — or to the public?

Would you be tempted to use the term “degradation” to describe the river with the dam?  If you do — you have slipped into normative science.  Why?  — because you have made an assumption that a free-flowing river is preferable to a dammed one.  Perhaps it is better policy-wise — but not better scientifically — just different — a value judgment that others should make — not scientists.

Or — you could take the exact same scientific information and label the river with the dam as “improved.”  After all — it will provide badly needed water in late summer — but the relative importance of that goal is a political determination — a value judgment — not a choice for scientists to make.  Again — the science is the same — the only thing that has changed is that you have embedded a different policy preference.  No other change!

This is so common these days that many listeners will not pick up on it!  How should scientists report these results?  My answer — scientists should use terminology that does not presuppose a value judgment — nor presuppose a policy preference.

In short — in this example — I suggest using the word “alteration” as being much more policy neutral.  Using “alteration” in this example does not imply that either state of the ecosystem is preferred policy-wise.

Let me wrap up — what should scientists do — my recommendation — play the science straight up — do not build in subtle policy preferences.  Be alert.   Test your wording for signs of policy bias.

For sure — there are temptations aplenty to co-opt scientists — mostly they come from policy advocates and politicians.  Whatever the temptation — avoid falling into the trap of stealth policy advocacy.  Leave the advocacy to advocates — stick to science.

And remember Charles Darwin’s advice — he was dead-on all those years ago — a scientist needs a “Heart of Stone.”

Thank you!

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Video Recording:  https://media.oregonstate.edu/media/0_melddnvc

Does the Public Expect Too Much from Science?

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Robert T. Lackey

More than two decades ago, while Deputy Director of EPA’s national research laboratory in Corvallis, Oregon, I presented a talk to a group of community activists about why salmon populations along the West Coast have dropped to less than 5% of their historical levels.  I’ve given such talks many times so I was confident that I had heard just about every question that might be asked.  I was wrong.

The opening question was asked by a well-known political activist.  He was direct, pointed, and bursting with hostility:  “You scientists always talk about our choices, but when will you finally tell us what we SHOULD do about the dramatic decline of West Coast salmon?  Quit talking about the science and your research and tell us what we should do!  Let’s get on with it!”

From the nods of approval offered by many in the audience, his impatience with science and scientists was broadly shared.

What does the public expect from scientists regarding today’s ecological policy issues? Some examples of such policy challenges include the decline of salmon;  deciding on the proper role of wildfire on public lands;  what to do, if anything, about climate change;  the consequences of declining biological diversity;  and making sense of the confusing policy choices surrounding “sustainability.”

The lament “if we just had some better science, a little more data, we could resolve this policy question” is common among both scientists and decision makers.  Calls for more research are everywhere in ecological policy debates.

In most cases, even if we had complete scientific knowledge about all aspects of an issue, the same rancorous debate would emerge.  Root policy differences are invariably over values and preferences, not science, data, and facts.

In a pluralistic society, with a wide array of values and preferences competing for dominance, the ecological policy debate is usually centered around whose values and preferences will carry the day rather than over scientific information.

So what was my answer to the emotionally charged question from the political activist?

It was: “Science, although an important part of policy debates, remains but one element, and often a minor one, in the decision-making process.  We scientists can assess the ecological consequences of various policy options, but in the end, it is up to society to prioritize those options and make their choices accordingly.”

He wasn’t pleased.

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Wild Salmon Recovery in the Western United States: Four Facts and a Corollary

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Robert T. Lackey

Despite a few recent newspaper headlines heralding several “record” salmon runs, most salmon runs in California, Oregon, Washington, and Idaho are a mere shadow of their pre-1848 levels.  Further, even most of these relatively small remaining runs are largely maintained by releases of hatchery-raised fish.  Wild salmon — typically defined as those whose parents spawned naturally in natural habitat — comprise only a small portion of most runs and their overall abundance is a sliver of historical levels.

The decline has been well known and for more than 160 years there have been concerted efforts to recover salmon runs.  Especially during the past three decades, the extent and cost of formal recovery efforts for wild salmon have substantially increased — in large part a response to requirements of the Endangered Species Act (ESA).

While using hatcheries to sustain relatively large salmon runs is plausible — although technically challenging — the requirements of the ESA relative to wild salmon have made the role of hatcheries in sustaining or increasing runs legally contentious.

In my interactions with professional colleagues over many years, they agree — usually only when speaking unofficially — that current efforts will not successfully recover wild salmon to abundances that would assure self-sustainability and support sizable sport and commercial harvest.  Such a level of abundance would need to be at least a third or more of the typical pre-1848 run size.

Even with the very large expenditures to recover wild salmon, what pushes the most knowledgeable people to the stunning conclusion that these well-meaning efforts will fail?

To succeed, a wild salmon recovery strategy must address several overarching and undisputed realities about the West Coast that have developed over many years.  Without addressing these realities, any wild salmon recovery strategy will fall far short of expectations.  It will be added to a long list — well over a century in the making — of noble, but failed salmon recovery strategies.  Even if society continues to spend billions to restore wild salmon runs, these efforts ultimately will be only marginally successful.

What are these realities and how must they be changed to recover wild salmon to even a third of their historical level?   Let’s look at the four key ones.

Fact 1:   Overall, wild salmon abundance south of the Canadian border, is very low and has been so for a long time.  Most spawning runs are far less than 10% of their pre-1848 levels.  Over two dozen Endangered Species Act “species” (distinct population segments) are now listed as threatened or endangered.  Many runs have already disappeared and more will follow unless there is a reversal of the long-term downward trajectory.

Fact 2:   We have been well aware for a long time of the main causes of the dire state of salmon runs along the West Coast.  These causes are well documented scientifically and include mining, dams, water pollution, habitat alteration, over-fishing, irrigation water withdrawals, predation on salmon by many species, competition with hatchery-produced salmon and other, often non-native fish species, and many other causes.

Fact 3:   Anywhere wild salmon were once plentiful (Europe, Asian Far East, Eastern North America), the decline in their abundance is roughly inversely proportional to the area’s growth in the human population.  Over decades and centuries, as the human population expanded in these regions, the size of salmon runs declined to minuscule levels.  Since 1848, the West Coast is playing out similarly for wild salmon.  For example, from a pre-1848 human population level of a few hundred thousand, California, Oregon, Washington, and Idaho are now home to 50 million people. Over the same time period, wild salmon abundance in the four States has declined from roughly 50 million to a few million.  And the future?  Assuming expected human population growth in these four States, by 2100 they will be home to somewhere between 150 and 200 million people — a tripling or quadrupling by the end of this century — barely 80 years from now.

Fact 4:   It is not just the sheer number of humans (Fact 3), but their individual and collective lifestyles that reduce the abundance of wild salmon.  In the absence of dramatic changes in economic policies and life-styles, future options for restoring salmon runs to significant, sustainable levels will be greatly constrained. For example, by 2100, with 150-200 million people living in the 4 West Coast states, consider the additional demand for houses, roads, Costcos, Starbucks, air conditioning, drinking water, office buildings — the list is a very long one.

What about the potential of current wild salmon recovery efforts to change the long-term, downward trajectory for wild salmon in California, Oregon, Washington, and Idaho?

Corollary 1:  To succeed in restoring wild salmon runs to significant, sustainable levels, a wild salmon recovery strategy must change the four facts or that strategy will fail.  If society only continues to spend billions of dollars in quick-fix efforts to restore wild salmon runs, then in most cases these efforts will be only marginally successful and the long-term downward trajectory of wild salmon will continue.  It is money spent on activities not likely to achieve recovery of wild salmon, however, it helps people feel better as they continue the behaviors and choices that preclude the recovery of wild salmon.  As important, it also sustains a jobs program for scientists and other technocrats by funding the salmon recovery industry.  This industry has become a multi-billion dollar enterprise and collectively forms an influential advocacy group.

Turning to the future to assess what is realistically plausible, maintaining sustainable populations of many highly valued non-native West Coast fish species (e.g., bluegill, walleye, smallmouth bass, largemouth bass, brook trout, and striped bass) is feasible, because these species, unlike salmon, are well adapted to the greatly altered West Coast aquatic environments.  Overall with a drastically altered aquatic environment, and not at all surprising, many nonnative fish species are doing well.  Nor should it be surprising that wild salmon are struggling to hang on in environments for which they are poorly adapted.

In conclusion, if society continues to ignore these four facts and the corollary, no one should be surprised by the lack of long-term success of wild salmon recovery efforts.  Perhaps these billions of dollars being spent to recover wild salmon should be considered “guilt money” — modern-day indulgences — a tax society and individuals willingly endure to alleviate collective and individual remorse about the sorry state of wild salmon.  After all, it is money spent on activities unlikely to achieve the recovery of wild salmon, but it perhaps helps many people feel better as people continue the behaviors and choices that essentially preclude wild salmon recovery.

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Is Science the Key to Resolving Environmental Policy Disputes?

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Robert T. Lackey

Is more and better science the key to resolving environmental policy debates?  Some scientists  — and many others without training in science — seem to think so.  The short answer, however, is that science is rarely, if ever, is the key.

But, how often have you heard this lament from scientists:

            “If we just had better science, or at least more science, more data, the best policy choice would be obvious — and we could move on.  It is a lack of science that is the main obstacle to deciding what to do.”

This lament, or permutations of it, is often followed by a proposed course of action:

            “Fund us and we’ll provide you with the necessary scientific information to make for an easy decision!”

I know.  I’ve followed this script many times in the never-ending search for research funding.   It is the reality for those of us employed in the highly competitive world of research and consulting.

Here’s my confession.  When I was working as a research scientist at the Environmental Protection Agency, part of my job was to convince the EPA regulatory people (i.e., the folks with the money) that their main problem was really a lack of scientific information.  You know the marketing pitch:  send money, you’ll buy more science, and more science will solve your policy-making problem.

To prosper these days, a research scientist must play this game and play it well.  More money means you can hire additional staff, buy better equipment, publish more papers, and ascend the scientific pecking order.

But the fact is that science rarely drives policy debates, at least not policy debates that people care much about.

Let me illustrate with an example of how more science muddles a policy debate.  It is an example from far away, a case study that you can analyze with detachment and comfort, but one that illustrates what has become ever so typical in ecological policy.

Think about my part of the world, the Pacific Northwest, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and British Columbia.  For over three decades, there has been a highly polarized debate over what the primary purpose of the publicly owned forests should be.

Simplifying this complex policy debate down its core question:

a)   Should these public lands be managed for sustained timber production to foster economic development generally, and for rural communities, specifically?

or

 b)   Should these public lands be preserved for non-consumptive uses such as recreation and species protection that primarily benefit urbanites?

But what have you read about?  About the plight of the northern spotted owl, right?  An at-risk species that almost no one, even most enviros, cared much about prior to its selection as the species of choice to trigger the Endangered Species Act.

Even more bizarre, the major political debate over choosing between two competing, and legitimate, policy goals collapsed into endless court cases revolving around the most esoteric life history details of this obscure species.

No wonder much of the public has become cynical about the political process — and the role of science.

Some policy advocates admit, at least in private, that selecting a charismatic species was a tactic to awaken the substantial legal power of the Endangered Species Act.  In short, the “scientific facts” about spotted owls became a legal weapon, a surrogate, used by advocates to achieve their primary policy goal:  to stop logging on public forests.

Conversely, other policy advocates, especially those promoting logging to support rural communities economically and meet domestic demand for lumber and paper, pitched science in a way that supported their policy goal:  to allow logging on public forests.

Great for policy advocates, they are free to use whatever tactics or tools work in policy debates, but for the credibility of scientists in the eyes of the public, it was very costly.

If through some miracle, we could miraculously and instantly learn everything possible about spotted owls, the policy debate would continue because science has simply become a weapon in the larger policy war.

It is values that largely drive policy choices, not science.  Yes, science is important in assessing the consequences of each of the available policy options, but it is people’s values that drive which option is preferred.  Similarly, policy “win-win” only exists in the sham arguments pitched in election-year political campaigns.  Every policy choice involves winners — and losers.  There are no free lunches;  an inconvenient truth for sure for scientists, the public, and decision-makers.

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